

Keeping on fuzzing and fixing Suricata

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Who am I ?



Threat model



SURICATA



What do I call fuzzing ?

```
while(CPUavailable()) {  
    input = GetInputFromCorpus(corpus);  
    mutate(&input);  
    process(input, &feedback); // checks for bugs  
    updateCorpus(&corpus, input, feedback);  
}
```



What do I call fuzzing ?




Demo



Suricata inputs



Configuration



Why fuzzing Suricata ?



Find bugs to fix them !

Efficiently

So that Suricata provides a positive cybersecurity value



Cybersecurity value



- Remote Code Execution : negative value
- Complete Denial Of Service : zero value
 - Rust panics
 - NULL dereferences
- Partial Denial Of Service : positive, but reduced value
 - Memory leaks
 - Quadratic complexity
 - Logic bugs/evasions/failed assertions



Assessing bugs

- Bug class
- Default configuration ? Specific rules ?
- One or both network endpoints controlled by an attacker ?
- Which versions are affected ?



Results since Suricata 6.0.0



Methodology



- Sources:
 - <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/list?q=label%3AProj-suricata>
 - <https://redmine.openinfosecfoundation.org/>
 - Only bugs that reached git master (no CIFuzz stats)
- Manual review
 - Remove duplicates
 - Remove false positives (bug in targets)
- Complete data
 - <https://catenacyber.fr/suricata-fuzz.csv>
 - <https://catenacyber.fr/suricata-bugs.csv>




Overall results


- 49 unique bugs in about one year
- 41 reported only by oss-fuzz, 8 reported also by other means
- Every bug found fixed in next version except :
 - 4 bugs fixed before getting into any release
 - 1 bug found in 6.0.0 fixed in 6.0.4 (evasion)
 - 1 bug found in 6.0.0 left until 7 (PCRE2)
 - 1 bug introduced and found in 6.0.2 to be fixed in 6.0.4 (RCE)



Bugs found in version




Bugs appearance



■ pre-6 ■ 6.0.0 ■ 6.0.2 ■ 7-dev




Bugs found by source



■ Network ■ Signatures




Bugs found by impact



■ RCE ■ DOS ■ Partial




Bugs found by impact



■ UAF ■ overflow ■ Null deref ■ Panic ■ Overread ■ evasion ■ timeout ■ leak ■ OOM ■ MSAN



Quadratic complexity in libhttp




Bugs missed by fuzzing

- 34 redmine tickets for 6.0.3
 - 1 duplicate, 1 irrelevant
 - 9 uniquely found by oss-fuzz
 - 1 found by oss-fuzz already reported otherwise
 - 22 missed

<https://redmine.openinfosecfoundation.org/versions/167>



Reasons for fuzzers misses



■ Semantic ■ Master ■ Config ■ Harnesses ■ Unknown





Improvements



Coverage

- Your fuzzer cannot find bugs in code it does not cover
- Mix of Rust and C
- RUSTFLAGS -Cpasses=sancov

<https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/4697>

<https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/5352>

<https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/6517>



Coverage



Coverage Report

View results by: [Directories](#) | [Files](#)

PATH	LINE COVERAGE	FUNCTION COVERAGE	REGION COVERAGE
libhttp/	49.93% (4241/8494)	56.25% (234/416)	40.88% (4007/9802)
rust/	21.95% (4382/19967)	37.84% (400/1057)	12.48% (1985/15911)
src/	36.81% (46197/125487)	40.44% (2178/5386)	33.77% (40456/119789)
TOTALS	35.61% (54820/153948)	41.00% (2812/6859)	31.92% (46448/145502)

2021 March 9th : first coverage report including Rust



Coverage



Coverage Report


View results by: [Directories](#) | [Files](#)

PATH	LINE COVERAGE	FUNCTION COVERAGE	REGION COVERAGE
libhttp/	50.22% (4144/8252)	56.39% (234/415)	41.37% (4036/9755)
rust/	71.35% (15461/21668)	70.68% (1150/1627)	59.77% (8939/14956)
src/	52.85% (65739/124377)	58.87% (3149/5349)	54.85% (63150/115140)
TOTALS	55.31% (85344/154297)	61.33% (4533/7391)	54.43% (76125/139851)

2021 March 31st



Results



More of the same fuzz target

- fuzz_applayerparserparse
- Choose app-layer protocol based on data[0]
- Or force one specific with env variable FUZZ_APPLAYER

<https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/5596>



Results

- 1 fuzz_applayerparserparse_dcerpc
- 1 fuzz_applayerparserparse_dnp3
- 1 fuzz_applayerparserparse_ftp
- 2 fuzz_applayerparserparse_http2
- 1 fuzz_applayerparserparse_ike
- 1 fuzz_applayerparserparse_mqtt
- 1 fuzz_applayerparserparse_smtp
- 0 fuzz_applayerparserparse



Structure-aware fuzzing


- fuzz_sigpcap
- We want to fuzz suricata, not libpcap
- <https://github.com/catenacyber/fuzzpcap>
- TCP single stream

<https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/5528>



Results

Bugs



Performance report

- POC : run on corpus
- Generate flamegraph

<https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/5995>



Improvements summary



- Coverage investigation
- Performance investigation
- Split per app-layer protocol
- Structure-awareness
- Extend configuration
- More asserts
- Asking why a bug was not found by fuzzers



Improvements to be done

- Just done : Default ruleset and fuzz only pcap
- Blockers
- Differential fuzzing for TCP splitting evasion
- More coverage and performance inspection

<https://redmine.openinfosecfoundation.org/issues/4125>



Thank you

Questions ?



Coverage



Coverage Report

View results by: [Directories](#) | [Files](#)

PATH	LINE COVERAGE	FUNCTION COVERAGE	REGION COVERAGE
libhttp/	52.27% (4314/8254)	59.52% (247/415)	42.89% (4221/9841)
rust/	76.28% (19140/25092)	63.52% (1480/2330)	64.81% (10053/15512)
src/	55.75% (70084/125708)	62.26% (3316/5326)	58.60% (67314/114879)
TOTALS	58.81% (93538/159054)	62.48% (5043/8071)	58.18% (81588/140232)

2021 October 4th

